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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and 
Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. WAS A SUMMONS ISSUED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE 
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN EVELYN MUIR'S FIRST CASE, OR WAS 
IT OTHERWISE ERROR TO DISMISS EVELYN MUIR'S FIRST CASE? THE 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW IS DE NOVO REVIEW WITH THE 
RECORD VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO EVELYN MUIR. 
DISCUSSION; Without holding an evidentiary hearing 
or any other hearing, the Court ruled that the activities of 
Hansen and Anderson on October 19, 1988, did not constitute 
issuance of a Summons, and dismissed the first case without 
prejudice. Dismissal on this record warrants de novo review 
with no deference given to the trial court. 
Citations; 
State. Department of Social Services vs. Viiil. 784 
P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989); 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt vs. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1989) 
2. WAS EVELYN MUIR'S FIRST CASE COMMENCED BY THE 
FILING OF A COMPLAINT AND WAS EVELYN MUIR'S SECOND CASE 
BROUGHT WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE FIRST CASE 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE, OR WAS IT OTHERWISE ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT 
COURT TO DISMISS THE SECOND CASE? THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
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REVIEW IS DE NOVO REVIEW WITH THE RECORD VIEWED IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO EVELYN MUIR. 
DISCUSSION; The Court also dismissed the second case 
without holding an evidentiary hearing or any other hearing. 
The Court retrospectively ruled that the first case had never 
been commenced, and therefore Evelyn Muir could not rely upon 
the Utah Saving Statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40. Such a 
dismissal with prejudice also warrants a de novo review with 
the record viewed in the light most favorable to Evelyn Muir 
based on the authorities cited under Issue No. One above. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules are set forth as addenda to this brief, as 
permitted by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) and 
24(f)(2): 
Addendum I - Constitution of Utah, Article I, §7 
Addendum II - Constitution of Utah, Article I, §11 
Addendum III - U.C.A., §78-12-40 
Addendum IV 
Addendum V 
- U.C.A., §78-27-25 
Addendum VI 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
- U.R.C.P. 
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1(a) 
3(a) 
3(c) 
4(a) 
4(b) 
4(d) 
1(a) (post April 1, 1990) 
3(a) (post April 1, 1990) 
3(b) (post April 1, 1990) 
4(a) (post April 1, 1990) 
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- U.R.C.P., 4(b) (post April 1, 1990) 
- U.R.C.P., 4(d) (post April 1, 1990) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a consolidated appeal of two (2) wrongful 
death actions filed by Evelyn Muir. The first case was 
dismissed without prejudice when the Court ruled that Summons 
had not issued within three (3) months of the filing of the 
Complaint. The second case was brought under the Utah Saving 
Statute at U.C.A., §78-12-40. The second case was dismissed 
with prejudice after the Court retrospectively ruled that the 
first case had never been commenced. Evelyn Muir appealed 
both dismissals and both Defendants cross-appealed the 
dismissal of the first case. 
FACTS 
Evelyn Muir was widowed when her husband was killed 
in a mine explosion on September 5, 1986. She filed her 
first wrongful death action on September 1, 1988, by and 
through the Salt Lake City law firm then known as Hansen and 
Anderson. On October 19, 1988, Hansen and Anderson signed 
Summonses and caused Summonses with Complaints to be placed 
in the hands of a person qualified to serve process upon the 
Defendants. (Record I, pp. 1-21) 
As set forth in Addendum VII to this Brief, a Hansen 
and Anderson shareholder stated the following about the 
firm's activities: 
My entire purpose in preparing the summonses 
and delivering them to Mr. Jackson in this 
matter was to comply with Rule 4(a) of the 
3 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. But for Rule 
4(a), I would not have prepared and delivered 
the summonses to Mr. Jackson. I have utilized 
Mr. Jackson on several occasions to serve 
process on behalf of clients of the firm. 
(Affidavit of William P. Schwartz, Record I, 
p. 157, Addendum VII). 
Evelyn Muir was in the process of selecting a new 
attorney, so Hansen and Anderson told the process server to 
wait before serving process so that successor counsel could 
coordinate service. It took longer than expected to select 
successor counsel, and in July, 1989, successor counsel 
contacted the process server and arranged for service of 
process, which was accomplished that month. (Record I, pp. 
16-21, 33-37). 
The Defendants moved for dismissal of the action on 
the grounds that summons had not been issued within the three 
(3) month period set forth in Rule 4(b) of the U.R.C.P. In 
addition to moving for dismissal based on that rule, 
Defendants also moved the Court to dismiss the* case with 
prejudice on the grounds that the case had never commenced 
due to failure to issue a summons within three* (3) months and 
Defendants also engaged in discovery going to the merits of 
the case by using formal discovery procedures to obtain an 
autopsy report from the Utah State Medical Exciminer. (Record 
I, pp. 20-30, 44-56, 91-93). 
Mrs. Muir opposed the motions with memoranda, 
affidavits, and deposition testimony, on the grounds that 
summons had been issued on October 19, 1988, that the 
Defendants had appeared and consented to the jurisdiction of 
the court through their conduct by seeking a dismissal with 
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prejudice and by engaging in discovery going into the merits 
of the case, and, in any event, the action could be refiled 
under the saving statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40. (Record I, pp. 
38-43, 66-70, 157-161). 
The District Court ruled that the activities of 
Hansen and Anderson on October 19, 1988, did not constitute 
issuance of a Summons, and therefore no Summons had been 
issued within the three (3) month period set forth in Rule 
4(b) of the U.R.C.P. The Court dismissed the case without 
prejudice. (Record I, pp 203-206, 225-258). 
Mrs. Muir filed a second Complaint prior to the 
expiration of the one (1) year period set forth in the Utah 
Saving Statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40. The Court ruled in the 
second case that Mrs. Muir could not rely on the Utah Savings 
Statute, because even though the Complaint in the first case 
had been filed with the Court prior to the running of the 
applicable statute of limitations, and had been dismissed 
without prejudice after the running of the statute of 
limitations, Summonses had not been issued within three (3) 
months in the prior case, and therefore the prior case had 
never been commenced. (Record II, pp. 1-24, 132-135). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Hansen and Anderson issued Summonses on October 
19, 1988, within three (3) months of the filing of the first 
Complaint on September 1, 1988. 
2. The Defendants appeared and litigated the first 
case on the merits by pursuing the records deposition of the 
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Utah State Medical Examiner, by seeking dismissal with 
prejudice, and by filing cross-appeals when the trial court 
rejected their efforts to obtain a dismissal with prejudice. 
Therefore, the Court has jurisdiction over th€* Defendants in 
both cases regardless of whether a Summons was issued within 
three (3) months of the filing of the Complaint in the first 
case filed by Evelyn Muir. 
3* In Utah, an action is commenced by the filing of 
a Complaint, regardless of whether a Summons is issued within 
three (3) months of the filing of the Complaint. 
4. Evelyn Muir's second case was properly brought 
under the Utah Saving Statute, U.C.A. §78-12-40, in that the 
Complaint in the first case was filed prior to the running of 
the statute of limitations and the case was dismissed without 
prejudice after the running of the statute of limitations. 
5. The dismissal without prejudice of the first 
case, when combined with the dismissal with prejudice of the 
second case based upon a retrospective ruling that the first 
case was never commenced, has the cumulative effect of 
denying Evelyn Muir due process of law, access to open 
courts, and remedy by due course of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
DISMISS THE FIRST CASE FILED BY EVELYN MUIR. 
Evelyn Muir placed her trust and confidence in the 
Court and in Hansen & Anderson, who were officers of the 
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Court responsible for preserving her rights and protecting 
her interests in connection with the mine explosion that 
widowed her on September 5, 1986. 
Hansen & Anderson filed Evelyn Muir's first wrongful 
death action on September 1, 1988, a few days prior to the 
running of the statute of limitations. With actual notice 
and knowledge that a Summons had to be issued within three 
(3) months, Hansen & Anderson prepared and signed Summonses 
on October 19, 1988, and placed them in the hands of a person 
qualified to serve process for the purpose of process to be 
served after Evelyn Muir selected successor counsel. 
(Affidavit of William P. Schwartz, Record I, p. 157, Addendum 
VII) . 
More than three (3) months elapsed after the filing 
of the Complaint before Evelyn Muir selected successor 
counsel. Successor counsel contacted the process server who 
had been given the signed Summonses and Complaints on October 
19, 1988, and arranged for service of process prior to the 
expiration of one (1) year from the filing of the Complaint. 
The applicable rules of procedure were complied with in every 
respect. Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 4(a), a Summons was placed in 
the hands of a person qualified to serve of process, pursuant 
to U.R.C.P. 4(b), this was done within three (3) months of 
the filing of the Complaint, and pursuant to U.R.C.P., 4(a), 
this was done for the purpose of service of process to be 
accomplished after Plaintiff selected successor counsel. The 
process server was qualified to serve process in this state 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 4(d) and was qualified to serve process 
outside of this state under U.C.A. §78-27-25. Such service 
of process was accomplished within one (1) year pursuant to 
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the provisions of U.R.C.P, 4(b) and the holding in Valley 
Asphalt. Inc. vs. Eldon J. Stubbs Construction, 714 P.2d 
1142 (Utah 1986). 
Nevertheless, the District Court dismissed the case 
without prejudice upon concluding that the activities of 
Hansen & Anderson on October 19, 1988, were not for the 
"purpose" of service of process in that process was to be 
served after Evelyn Muir secured successor counsel. 
There is no language in U.R.C.P. 4(a) providing that 
issuance of a Summons for purpose of service cit a future date 
does not constitute issuance of a Summons. The District 
Court unnecessarily narrowed U.R.C.P. 4(a). In so doing, the 
District Court failed to follow U.R.C.P. 1(a), which provides 
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
This matter should be reversed and remanded for the 
simple reason that Summonses were issued on October 19, 1988. 
Assuming arguendo that the Summonses were not issued 
on October 19, 1988, it was still error to dismiss Evelyn 
Muir's first case, because the Court obtained personal 
jurisdiction over both named Defendants when they appeared 
and litigated on the merits. Defendants did not limit 
themselves to a simple motion to quash service*. Instead, 
they moved for dismissal of the action with prejudice and 
conducted discovery going to the underlying factual merits of 
the action by pursuing the records deposition of the Utah 
State Medical Examiner in order to secure medical records of 
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the autopsy of Evelyn Muir's late husband. Not satisfied 
with a dismissal without prejudice, Defendants pursued a 
dismissal with prejudice, and when the District Court 
rejected those efforts, they filed cross-appeals to the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
Due to all of this conduct seeking dismissal with 
prejudice and using the power of the Court to obtain 
discovery going to the underlying factual merits of the case, 
Defendants can no longer claim that the Court lacks personal 
jurisdiction over them on account of any defect in issuance 
of Summons. A defective Summons is like a baseball pitched 
outside of the strike zone on a full count. The batter can 
take a ball and get a walk, which is like a motion to quash. 
The batter is also free to swing the bat, which is like a 
motion to dismiss with prejudice and other litigation 
activity going to the merits of a lawsuit. If the batter 
connects for extra bases, the choice to swing the bat will 
have paid off. However, if the batter misses, he will not be 
allowed to walk to first. Yet, in this case, the figurative 
batter was treated in that way when a dismissal without 
prejudice was allowed after Defendants had litigated on the 
merits and sought dismissal with prejudice. 
While it may no longer be necessary to exalt form 
over substance by reciting the magic words "special 
appearance" when quashing service of process, and while some 
procedural motions concerning jurisdiction are not waived by 
being combined with other motions, the narrow ability to 
avoid personal jurisdiction through a quash of service is 
lost when Defendants appear and litigate on the merits in an 
attempt to secure dismissal with prejudice. 
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In summary, the Summonses in this case were properly 
issued within three (3) months of the filing of the 
Complaint. Even if they were not, Defendants, who are still 
before this Court on their own cross-appeal seeking dismissal 
with prejudice are well beyond the point of using any defect 
in issuance Summons as a basis for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over them. The case should be remanded for 
further proceedings on the merits. 
POINT II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO 
DISMISS THE SECOND CASE FILED BY EVELYN MUIR. 
Evelyn Muir filed a second lawsuit after Defendants 
started claiming that her first lawsuit had already been 
automatically deemed dismissed. The Defendants again raised 
some purely procedural defenses. This time, the District 
Court properly noted that Defendants could not secure a 
dismissal based upon procedural points, because they had 
appeared on the merits. The District Court wrote: 
The Court will not get into the issue of the 
sufficiency of the service on Apache since 
this Defendant has appeared in this case by 
way of a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and 
the Amended Complaint, and those motions were 
filed on Febrxiary 20, 1990. 
In addition, the lack of proper service is not 
usually grounds for dismissal but may result 
in an order quashing the return of service, 
but nothing more. (Record II, p. 132-133) 
Evelyn Muir had to file her second lawsuit within one 
(1) year of December 1, 1988, because Defendants were arguing 
that the first case had been automatically dismissed three 
(3) months after it had been filed (Record I, p. 48) 
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Accordingly, Evelyn Muir could not await the outcome 
of her first case, but prudently filed her second case on 
November 27, 1989, so that it was filed prior to December 1, 
1989. 
After the Court subsequently dismissed her first case 
without prejudice, she amended the Complaint in the second 
case once as a matter of course to indicate specifically that 
it was brought under the provisions of the Utah Saving 
Statute at U.C.A. §78-12-40 within one (1) year after a 
failure otherwise than upon the merits in an action commenced 
within due time. (Record II, p. 15) 
Even though the District Court rejected the 
Defendants1 procedural arguments concerning service of 
process, it retrospectively ruled that the first case had 
never been commenced, because Summons had not been issued 
within three (3) months of the filing of the Complaint, and, 
therefore, Evelyn Muir could not rely on the Utah Saving 
Statute in the second case. 
This was an error of law on the part of the District 
Court. In Utah, an action is commenced by the filing of a 
Complaint, regardless of whether a Summons is subsequently 
issued within due time. 
Under tne Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that were in 
effect at the time, U.R.C.P. 3(a) provided that an action was 
commenced by filing a Complaint with the Court, or by the 
service of a Summons, and U.R.C.P. 3(c) provided that the 
Court had jurisdiction from the time of the filing of the 
Complaint or the service of the Summons. 
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For purposes of determining whether a prior action 
was commenced in due time when a subsequent action is filed 
under a saving statute, in some states the filing of the 
Complaint itself commences the action while in other states 
an action is not deemed commenced within due time unless a 
Summons is subsequently issued. 
Utah is one of the states where the filing of the 
Complaint alone is sufficient. Utah is so listed in an 
annotation on the subject that appears at 27 ALR.2d 236, 255. 
In the case of Askwith vs. Ellis, 38 P.2d 757 (Utah 
1934) the Utah Supreme Court held that an action is commenced 
by the filing of a Complaint alone. This principle of law 
was again recently re<iffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of Madsen vs. Borthick, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). 
In that case, the Defendants tried to expand the 
requirements for commencing an action for purpose of a 
subsequent action under the Utah Saving Statute by arguing 
that a prior action held not been commenced in due time 
because a pre-complaint statutory notice requirement 
applicable to the case had not been complied with. The Utah 
Supreme Court rejected this effort to expand the requirements 
for commencing an action. Justice Zimmerman wrote: 
In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of 
a complaint or the service of a summons . . 
Accordingly, Evelyn Muir's first case was commenced 
within due time when the Complaint was filed on September 1, 
1988, it was dismissed without prejudice after the statute of 
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limitations on her wrongful death claim had run, and she was 
entitled to rely on the Utah Saving Statute. 
Rules 3 and 4 of the U.R.C.P. were amended effective 
April 1, 1990. The requirement that a Summons be issued 
within three (3) months and served within one (1) year was 
changed so that now the only requirement is that the Summons 
be served no later than one hundred twenty (120) days after 
the filing of the Complaint unless the Court allows a longer 
period for good cause shown. The new rule specifically 
states that a failure to timely serve will result in a 
dismissal without prejudice. To the extent that the new Rule 
4 has the same basic purpose as the old rule, failures to 
issue or serve process under the old rule should also lead to 
dismissal without prejudice. To the extent that the decision 
in this case under the old rule has some precedential value 
in construing the new rule, this Court should reverse and 
remand this action so that the handling of this case is 
consistent with the dismissal without prejudice standard in 
the new rule. 
Such a result would be fair, just, and reasonable. 
Any failure to issue a Summons within three (3) months was 
not an adjudication upon the merits, but merely a procedural 
defect that did not relate to the merits in any way. 
Hansen & Anderson signed a Summons and gave it to a 
process server on October 19, 1988, for the express purpose 
of complying with the issuance requirement under the old 
rule. (Affidavit of William P. Schultz, Record I at p. 157, 
Addendum VII). Yet, based upon the cumulative rulings of the 
Court in the two (2) cases filed by Evelyn Muir, when Evelyn 
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Muir and her old attorneys woke up on the morning of December 
2, 1988, without their knowing it, their action was deemed 
never commenced and forever barred. 
The District Court did not cite any precedent that 
Hansen & Anderson could or should have relied upon on October 
19, 1988, to take any action other than the action taken. 
Evelyn Muir, who placed her trust and confidence in the Court 
for remedy after she was widowed in a mine explosion, is left 
with no satisfactory explanation of how her old attorneys 
could have made a conscious and affirmative effort to comply 
with the rules on October 19, 1988, only to have the District 
Court subsequently and retrospectively rule that her lawsuit 
had never been commenced. 
Under these circumstances, the cumulative effect of 
the dismissals rises to the level of a denial of due process 
of law under Article 1, Section 7, of the Constitution of 
Utah, and a denial of Evelyn Muirfs rights to open courts and 
remedy by due course of law administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay under Article I, Section 11, of the 
Constitution of Utah (See Addenda I and II). 
CONCLUSION 
The orders of dismissal should be reversed and the 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for further 
proceedings on all of Evelyn Muir's claims. 
14 
DATED this ber, 1990. 
COPI] 
for 
Appellant, an^  
Evelyn Muir 
aint] 
Cross-JSfcpellee, 
muir.brf 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
H. STATE BOUNDARIES 
m . ORDINANCE 
IV. ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUF-
FRAGE 
V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
VI. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
Vn. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
VIE. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
IX. CONGRESSIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE 
APPORTIONMENT 
X. EDUCATION 
XI. COUNTIES, CITIES AND TOWNS 
Xn. CORPORATIONS 
XHI. REVENUE AND TAXATION 
XIV. PUBUC DEBT 
XV. MILITIA 
XVI. LABOR 
XVH. WATER RIGHTS 
XVIH. FORESTRY 
XIX. PUBUC BUILDINGS AND STATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
XX. PUBUC LANDS 
XXI. SALARIES 
XXII. MISCELLANEOUS 
XXIH. AMENDMENT AND REVISION 
XXIV. SCHEDULE 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
Section 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1898 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1898 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable par t of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. 1898 
Sec. 4. [Religious l iberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The State shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public t rust or for any vote a t 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with its functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1898 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1898 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual r ight of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1985 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
433 
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(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge, or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge, or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by 
s ta tute , when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence tha t the person would 
constitute a substantial danger to self or any 
other person or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law 1989 
Sec. 9. [Excess ive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines 
shall not be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor 
1896 
Sec . 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the r ight of tr ial by jury shall re-
main inviolate In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded 1896 
Sec . 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay, and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tr ibunal in this Sta te , by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and b> counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be compelled to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself, a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature 
1949 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The n g h t of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no 
war ran t shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or afifi rmation, part icularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or res t ra in the 
freedom of speech or of the press In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the t ru th may be given in evidence 
to the jury, and if it shall appear to the jury tha t the 
mat te r charged as libelous is t rue , and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the par ty 
shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the r ight 
to determine the law and the fact 1896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the nght of suffrage Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State» under regulations to be prescribed by law 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhenng to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act 1896 
Sec . 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] 
Th§ military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in t ime of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist withm this 
S t a t e 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without j ust compensation 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity 1896 
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or other governmental entity, the same as to actions 
by private parties, except under Section 78-12-33 5 
1988 
78-12-33.5. Statute of limitations — Asbestos 
damages — Action by state or govern-
mental entity. 
(1) (a) No statute of limitations or repose may bar 
an action by the state or other governmental en-
tity to recover damages from any manufacturer 
of any construction materials containing asbes-
tos, when the action arises out of the manufac 
turer's providing the materials, directly or 
though other persons, to the state or other gov-
ernmental entity or to a contractor on behalf of 
the state or other governmental entity 
(b) Subsection (a) provides for actions not yet 
barred, and also acts retroactively to permit ac-
tions under this section that are otherwise 
barred 
(2) As used in this section, "asbestos" means 
asbestiform vaneties of 
(a) chrysotile (serpentine), 
(b) crocidohte (nebeckite), 
(c) amosite (cummingtonite-grunente), 
(d) anthophylhte, 
(e) tremoiite, or 
(f) actmohte. 1988 
78-12-34. Repealed. 1981 
ARTICLE 3 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
78-12-35. Effect of absence from state. 
Where a cause of action accrues against a person 
when he is out of the state, the action may be com-
menced wi thm the term as limited by this chapter 
after his re turn to the s tate If after a cause of action 
accrues he departs from the state, the t ime of his 
absence is not part of the t ime limited for the com-
mencement of the action 1987 
78-12-36. Effect of disability. 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than 
for the recovery of real property, is a t the t ime the 
cause of action accrued, either under the age of major-
ity or mentally incompetent and without a legal 
guardian, the t ime of the disability is not a par t of the 
t ime limited for the commencement of the action 
1987 
78-12-37. Effect of death. 
If a person entitled to bring an action dies before 
the expiration of the t ime limited for the commence-
ment thereof, and the cause of action survives, an 
action may be commenced by his representatives af-
ter the expiration of t ha t t ime and within one year 
from his death If a person against whom an action 
may be brought dies before the expiration of the t ime 
limited for the commencement thereof and the cause 
of action survives, an action may be commenced 
against the representatives after the expiration of 
t ha t t ime and within one year after the issue of let-
ters tes tamentary or of administrat ion 1953 
78-12-38. Effect of death of defendant outside 
this state. 
If a person against whom a cause of action exists 
dies without the state, the t ime which elapses be-
tween his death and the expiration of one year after 
the issuing, within this state, of letters tes tamentary 
or letters of administrat ion is not a par t of the t ime 
limited for the commencement of an action therefor 
against his executor or adminis trator 1953 
78-12-39. Effect of war. 
When a person is an alien subject or a citizen of a 
country at war with the United States, the t ime of the 
continuance of the war is not a par t of the period 
limited for the commencement of the action 1963 
78-12-40. Effect of failure of act ion not on 
merits. 
If any action is commenced within due t ime and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if 
the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the meri ts , and the t ime 
limited either b> law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representat ives, 
may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure 1953 
78-12-41. Effect of injunction or prohibition. 
When the commencement of an action is stayed by 
injunction or a statutory prohibition the time of the 
continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the 
action 19S3 
78-12-42. Disability must exist when right of ac-
tion accrues. 
No person can avail himself of a disability, unless it 
existed when his right of action accrued 1953 
78-12-43. All d i sab i l i t i e s must be removed . 
When two or more disabilities coexist a t the t ime 
the n g h t of action accrues, the l imitation does not 
attach until all are removed. 1953 
78-12-44. Effect of payment , acknowledgment , 
or promise to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any par t of 
the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or 
claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have 
been made, an action may be brought within the pe-
riod prescribed for the same after such payment , ac-
knowledgment or promise, but such acknowledgment 
or promise must be m writing, signed by the par ty to 
be charged thereby When a r ight of action is barred 
by the provisions of any s ta tute , it shall be unavail-
able either as a cause of action or ground of defense 
1953 
78-12-45. Action barred in another state barred 
here. 
When a cause of action has arisen in another state 
or territory, or in a foreign country, and by the laws 
thereof an action thereon cannot there be maintained 
against a person by reason of the lapse of time, an 
action thereon shall not be maintained against him 
m this state, except in favor of one who has been a 
citizen of this state and who has held the cause of 
action from the time it accrued. 1953 
78-12-46. "Action" includes special proceeding. 
The word "action," as used in this chapter, is to be 
construed, whenever it is necessary to do so, as in-
cluding a special proceeding of a civil nature 1953 
78-12-47. Separate trial of statute of limitations 
issue in malpractice actions. 
In any action against a physician and surgeon, den-
tist, osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical 
therapist, registered nurse, clinical laboratory 
bioanalyst, clinical laboratory technologist, or a h-
in 
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78-27-21. Effect of failure to file certificate — 
Service of process upon nonresident. 
Whenever any such nonresident doing business; as 
provided in the preceding section [Section 78-27-20] 
shall fail to file such certificate, or such manager, 
super intendent or agent designated in such certifi-
cate cannot be found within the s ta te of Utah, sen/ice 
of process upon such nonresident in any action aris-
ing out of the conduct of his business may be had by 
serving any person employed by or acting as agent for 
such nonresident. 1953 
78-27-22. Jur i sd ic t ion o v e r nonres idents — Pur-
pose of provision. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determina-
tion, that the public interest demands the state pro-
vide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who, through certain 
significant minimal contacts with this state, incur 
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protec-
tion. This legislative action is deemed necessary be-
cause of technological progress which has substan-
tially increased the flow of commerce between the 
several states resulting in increased interaction be-
tween persons of this state and persons of other 
states. 
The provisions of this act, to .ensure maximum pro-
tection to citizens of this state, should be applied so as 
to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to 
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 1969 
78-27-23. Jur i sd ic t ion o v e r nonres idents — Def-
initions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individ-
ual, firm, company, association, or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within 
this state" mean activities of a nonresident per-
son, his agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within the 
state of Utah. 1969 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts 
submitting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who 
in person or through an agent does any of the follow-
ing enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an indi-
vidual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, 
or risk located within this state at the time of 
contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in 
the marital relationship, within this state not-
withstanding subsequent departure from the 
state; or the commission in this state of the act 
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not 
a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence 
over which the defendent had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse 
within this s ta te which gives rise to a paternity 
suit under Chapter 45a, Title 78, to determine 
paterni ty for the purpose of establishing respon-
sibility for child support. 1987 
78-27-25. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Ser-
vice of process. 
Service of process on any party outside the s ta te 
may be made pursuant to the applicable provisions of 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Service of summons and of a copy of the complaint, 
if any, may also be made upon any person located 
without this s ta te by any individual over 21 years of 
age, not a par ty to the action, with the same force and 
effect as though the summons had been personally 
served within this s ta te . No order of court is required. 
An affidavit of the server shall be filed with the court 
s ta t ing the t ime, manner and place of service. The 
court may consider the affidavit, or any other compe-
tent proofs, in determining whether proper service 
has been made. 
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to 
limit or affect the r ight to serve process in any other 
manner provided by law. 1969 
78-27-26. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — 
Only claims arising from enumerated 
acts may be asserted. 
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein 
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in 
which jurisdiction over him is based upion this act. 
1969 
78-27-27. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — De-
fault judgments. 
No default shall be entered until the expiration of 
at least thirty days after service. A default judgment 
rendered on service may be set aside only on a show-
ing which would be timely and sufficient to set aside 
a default judgment rendered on personal service 
within this state. 1969 
78-27-28. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — 
When may be exercised. 
Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, ju-
risdiction established under this act shall be exer-
cised regardless of when the claim arose. 1969 
78-27-29 to 78-27-31. S u p e r s e d e d . 1983 
78-27-32. Release or settlement of personal in-
jury claim — When voidable. 
(1) Any release of liability or settlement agree-
ment entered into within a period of fifteen days from 
the date of an occurrence causing physical injury to 
any person, or entered into prior to the initial dis-
charge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium 
in which the injured person is confined as a result of 
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable 
by the injured person, as provided in this act. 
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settle-
ment agreement, together with any payment or other 
consideration received in connection with this release 
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party 
to whom the release or settlement agreement was 
given, by the later of the following dates: 
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the oc-
currence causing the injuries which are subject of 
the settlement agreement or liability release; or 
(b) within fifteen days after the date of the in-
jured person's discharge from the hospital or san-
itarium in which this person has been confined 
continuously since the date of the occurrence 
causing the injury. 1973 
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PART I. 
SCOPE OF RULES—ONE FORM OF 
ACTION. 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, 
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in 
all special statutory proceedings, except as governed 
by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted 
by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. 
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on 
January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict 
therewith shall be of no further force or effect. They 
govern all proceedings in actions brought after they 
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions 
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion 
of the court their application in a particular action 
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasi-
ble or would work injustice, in which event the for-
mer procedure applies. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 2. One form of action. 
There shall be one form of action to be known as 
"civil action." 
PART n. 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE 
OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, 
MOTIONS AND ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced 
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the 
service of a summons. If the action is commenced by 
the service of a summons, the complaint, together 
with the summons and proof of service thereof, must 
be filed within ten days after such service and a copy 
of the complaint shall be served upon or mailed to the 
defendant if his address is known; if unknown, a copy 
must be deposited with the clerk for him, or the ac-
tion thus commenced shall be deemed dismissed and 
the court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof; 
provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall 
not change the requirement of § 12-1-8, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
(b) Filing copy of complaint. When the com-
plaint is filed, a copy thereof shall be deposited with 
the court for the benefit of the defendants not other-
wise served with such copy at the time of the service 
of the summons. Any defendant, not served with a 
copy of the complaint, and for whom no copy thereof 
is available with the court, may serve a written de-
mand upon the plaintiff for a copy of such complaint, 
and thereafter the time in which such defendant shall 
be required to plead to the complaint shall commence 
to run from the date a copy thereof is served upon 
such defendant. 
(c) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have ju-
risdiction from the time of filing the complaint or the 
service of the summons. 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Issuance of summons. The summons may be 
signed and issued by the plaintiff or his attorney. A 
summons shall be deemed to have issued when placed 
in the hands of a qualified person for the purpose of 
service. Separate summonses may be issued and 
served. 
(b) Time of issuance and service. If an action is 
commenced by the filing of a complaint, summons 
must issue thereon within three months from the 
date of such filing. The summons must be served 
within one year after the filing of the complaint or 
the action will be deemed dismissed, provided that in 
any action brought against two or more defendants in 
which personal service has been obtained upon one of 
them within the year, the other or others may be 
served or appear at any time before trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall 
contain the name of the court, the names or designa-
tions of the parties to the action, the county in which 
it is brought, be directed to the defendant, state the 
time within which the defendant is required to an-
swer the complaint in writing, and shall notify him 
that in case of his failure to do so, judgment by de-
fault will be rendered against him. If the summons be 
served without a copy of the complaint, or by publica-
tion, it shall briefly state the sum of money or other 
relief demanded, and in case of publication of sum-
mons such summons as published shall contain a de-
scription of the subject matter or res involved in the 
action. Where the summons is served without a com-
plaint, it shall note therein that a copy of said com-
plaint will be served upon or mailed to defendant 
within ten days after such service or that if the ad-
dress of defendant is unknown, the complaint will be 
filed with the clerk of the court within ten days after 
such service. 
(d) By whom served. The summons, and a copy of 
the complaint, if any, may be served: 
(1) Within the state, by the sheriff of the 
county where the service is made, or by his dep-
uty, or by any other person over the age of 21 
years, and not a party to the action; provided, 
that this rule shall not abrogate the provisions of 
chapter 28, Laws of Utah, 1945. 
(2) In another state or United States territory 
by the sheriff of the county where the service is 
made, or by his deputy, or by a United States 
marshal or his deputy. 
(3) In a foreign country, either: 
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of 
the foreign country; or 
(B) upon an individual, by delivery to him 
personally, and upon a corporation or part-
nership or association, by delivery to an offi-
cer, a managing or general agent; or 
(C) by any form of mail, requiring a 
signed receipt, to be addressed and 
dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
party to be served; or 
(D) as directed by order of the court. 
Service under (B) or (D) above may be made by 
any person who is not a party and is not less than 
21 years of age or who is designated by order of 
the court. 
(e) Personal service in state. Personal service 
within the state shall be as follows: 
(1) Upon a natural person of the age of 14 
years or over, by delivering a copy thereof to him 
personally, or by leaving such copy at his usual 
place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing; or by delivering a 
M 
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PART L 
SCOPE OF RULES—ONE FORM OF 
ACTION. 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, 
the circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in 
all special statutory proceedings, except as governed 
by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted 
by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. 
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on 
January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict 
therewith shall be of no further force or effect. They 
govern all proceedings in actions brought after they 
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions 
then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion 
of the court their application in a particular action 
pending when the rules take effect would not be feasi-
ble or would work injustice, in which event the for-
mer procedure applies. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 2. One form of action. 
There shall be one form of action to be known as 
"civil action." 
PART II. 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE 
OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, 
MOTIONS AND ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced 
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by 
service of a summons together with a copy of the com-
plaint in accordance with Rule 4. If the action is com-
menced by the service of a summons and a copy of the 
complaint, then the complaint, the summons and 
proof of service, must be filed within ten days of such 
service. If, in a case commenced under paragraph 
(a)(2) of this rule, the complaint, summons and proof 
of service are not filed within ten days of service, the 
action commenced shall be deemed dismissed and the 
court shall have no further jurisdiction thereof; pro-
vided, however, that the foregoing provision shall not 
change the requirement of Utah Code Ann. Section 
12-1-8 (1986). 
(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have ju-
risdiction from the time of filing of the complaint or 
service of the summons and a copy of the complaint. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1990.) 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be 
signed and issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs 
attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced un-
der Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of 
the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days 
after the filing of the complaint unless the court al-
lows a longer period of time for good cause shown. If 
the summons and complaint are not timely served, 
the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on 
application of any party or upon the court's own ini-
tiative. In any action brought against two or more 
defendants on which service has been obtained upon 
one of them within the 120 days or such longer period 
as may be allowed by the court, the other or others 
may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall 
contain the name of the court, the address of the 
court, the names of the parties to the action, and the 
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to 
the defendant, state the name, address and telephone 
number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and other-
wise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It 
shall state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and 
shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do 
so, judgment by default will be rendered against the 
defendant. It shall state either that the complaint is 
on file with the court or that the complaint will be 
filed with the court within ten days of service. If ser-
vice is made by publication, the summons shall 
briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money 
or other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on 
file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint 
may be served in this state or any other state or terri-
tory of the United States, by the sheriff or constable, 
or by the deputy of either, by a United States Mar-
shal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any other per-
son 18 years of age or older at the time of service, and 
not a party to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be 
made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered 
by subparagraphs (2), (3) or (4) below, by deliver-
ing a copy of the summons and/or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy 
at the individual's dwelling house or usual place 
of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy 
of the summons and/or the complaint to an agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive 
service of process; 
(2) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 
years) by delivering a copy to the infant and also 
to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if 
none can be found within the state, then to any 
person having the care and control of the infant, 
or with whom the infant resides, or in whose ser-
vice the infant is employed; 
(3) Upon a natural person judicially declared to 
be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting 
his own affairs, by delivering a copy to the person 
and to the person's legal representative if one has 
been appointed and in the absence of such repre-
sentative, to the individual, if any, who has care, 
custody or control of the person; 
(4) Upon an individual incarcerated or commit-
ted at a facility operated by the state or any of its 
political subdivisions, by delivering a copy to the 
person who has the care, custody, or control of 
the individual to be served, or to that person's 
designee or to the guardian or conservator of the 
individual to be served if one has been appointed, 
who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the pro-
cess to the individual served; 
(5) Upon any corporation, not herein otherwise 
provided for, up>on a partnership or other unin-
corporated association which is subject to suit un-
der a common name, by delivering a copy thereof 
to an officer, a managing.or general agent, or 
other agent authorized by appointment or by law 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVELYN MUIR, LINDA MUIR, 
DEANNA PFEIFFER, SANDRA 
JENKINS, MARK MUIR, MARLO 
JENKINS and DOUGLAS BAILEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
W. H. BURT EXPLOSIVES, INC., 
a New Mexico corporation and 
APACHE POWDER COMPANY, 
a New Jersey corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM P. SCHWARTZ 
Civil No. 5719 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
William P. Schwartz, being first duly sworn, hereby testifies as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah and 
am a shareholder in the law firm of Hansen & Anderson, former counsel for the 
plaintiffs in this action. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth 
herein. 
VII 
2. In late July of 1988, Ross Anderson, a shareholder in Hansen & 
Anderson, was contacted by Linda Muir, one of the plaintiffs in the above action, 
in connection with an explosion which occurred on September 5, 1986 in a blasting 
and prospecting operation located in Duchesne County known as the "Golden 
Phoenix Claims.11 Mr. Wallace A. Muir, the father of Linda Muir, was killed in the 
explosion; Douglas Bailey and Mario Jenkins were injured in the explosion. 
3# The circumstances surrounding the explosion strongly indicated 
that a portion of the fuse used at the Golden Phoenix Claims on September 5, 1986 
burned at a much faster rate than other portions of the fuse, resulting in an 
unexpected explosion. Because the explosion occurred on September 5, 1986, Mr. 
Anderson and I were immediately concerned about the running of the statute of 
limitation in regard to claims against Apache Powder Company ("Apache") and W. 
H. Burt Explosives, Inc. ("Burt"), the respective entities which manufactured and 
sold the blasting fuse that was used at the Golden Phoenix Claims at the time of 
the explosion. Because of the two-year statute of limitation in Utah relating to 
wrongful death actions (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28), Mr. Anderson and I 
concluded that a complaint had to be filed on behalf of the plaintiffs no later than 
September 5, 1988. 
4. On September 1, 1988, Hansen & Anderson commenced this action 
by filing the Complaint on behalf of the plaintiffs in this Court against Apache 
and Burt. 
5. In October of 1988, we informed the plaintiffs that we would not 
represent them further in the case and that they should locate successor counsel. 
2 
We informed the plaintiffs that, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summonses had to be issued within three-months of the filing of the Complaint 
and that the summonses and Complaint had to be served within one-year of the 
filing of the Complaint. 
6. In order to give the plaintiffs as much time as possible to find 
successor counsel, Mr. Anderson and I determined to cause the summonses to be 
issued to Apache and Burt within three-months of the filing of the Complaint. 
Therefore, on October 19, 1988, I prepared and executed summonses for Burt and 
Apache. After executing the summonses, I placed them in the hands of Steven F. 
Jackson, an employee of Hansen & Anderson, for the purpose of service of process 
upon Burt and Apache. At the time I delivered the summonses to Mr. Jackson, I 
told him that I wanted him to serve the summonses and the Complaint, but I asked 
him to hold off on service for a time because our firm was withdrawing from the 
case and the plaintiffs were attempting to locate new counsel who might want to 
coordinate service. 
7. Plaintiffs were not able to locate new counsel as soon as they had 
hoped. However, in June of 1989, Mr. Robert H. Copier notified Mr. Anderson 
that Mr. Copier would be representing certain of the plaintiffs in this action. 
Therefore, our firm filed a Notice of Withdrawal and Mr. Copier filed a Notice of 
Appearance on behalf of certain of the plaintiffs. 
8» In July of 1989, Mr. Copier instructed Mr. Jackson to proceed with 
service of the summonses and the Complaint in the manner set forth in the 
Affidavit of Steve Jackson, dated July 3, 1989. 
3 
9. My entire purpose in preparing the summonses and delivering them 
to Mr. Jackson in this matter was to comply with Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. But for Rule 4(a), I would not have prepared and delivered the 
summonses to Mr. Jackson. I have utilized Mr. Jackson on several occasions to 
serve process on behalf of clients of the firm. 
DATED: November OX , 1989. 
William P. Schwartz 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me this^T^day o f ^ ^ g ^ 9 8 9 . 
"Totar^Public/7 lj. Not 
Residing a 
CU ^L. 
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